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Data-Aided Secure Massive MIMO Transmission
under the Pilot Contamination Attack
Yongpeng Wu, Chao-Kai Wen, Wen Chen, Shi Jin, Robert Schober, and Giuseppe Caire
Abstract—In this paper, we study the design of secure com-
munication for time division duplex multi-cell multi-user mas-
sive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems with active
eavesdropping. We assume that the eavesdropper actively attacks
the uplink pilot transmission and the uplink data transmission
before eavesdropping the downlink data transmission of the
users. We exploit both the received pilots and the received data
signals for uplink channel estimation. We show analytically that
when the number of transmit antennas and the length of the
data vector both tend to infinity, the signals of the desired
user and the eavesdropper lie in different eigenspaces of the
received signal matrix at the base station provided that their
signal powers are different. This finding reveals that decreasing
(instead of increasing) the desired user’s signal power might be
an effective approach to combat a strong active attack from
an eavesdropper. Inspired by this observation, we propose a
data-aided secure downlink transmission scheme and derive
an asymptotic achievable secrecy sum-rate expression for the
proposed design. For the special case of a single-cell single-
user system with independent and identically distributed fading,
the obtained expression reveals that the secrecy rate scales
logarithmically with the number of transmit antennas. This is
the same scaling law as for the achievable rate of a single-
user massive MIMO system in the absence of eavesdroppers.
Numerical results indicate that the proposed scheme achieves
significant secrecy rate gains compared to alternative approaches
based on matched filter precoding with artificial noise generation
and null space transmission.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks are widely used in civilian and military
applications and have become an indispensable part of our
daily lifes. Therefore, secure communication is a critical issue
for future wireless networks. As a complement to the con-
ventional cryptographic techniques, new approaches to secure
communication based on information theoretical concepts,
such as the secrecy capacity of the propagation channel, have
been developed and are collectively referred to as physical
layer security [1–6].
Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) technology has
been shown to be a promising means for providing multiplex-
ing gains and diversity gains, leading to improved performance
[7–12]. In particular, massive MIMO technology, which uti-
lizes a very large number of antennas at the BS and simple
signal processing to provide services for a comparatively small
(compared to the number of antennas) number of active mobile
users, is a promising approach for efficient transmission of
massive amounts of information and is regarded as a key tech-
nology in 5G [13]. Pilot contamination is a major impairment
in massive MIMO systems [14] and many approaches have
been proposed to solve this problem [15–18]. For example, the
authors of [18] proposed an approach based on Chu sequences,
which efficiently reduces the effect of pilot contamination.
Most studies on physical layer security in massive MIMO
systems assume that the eavesdropper is passive and does
not attack the communication process of the system [19–
23]. However, a smart eavesdropper can perform a pilot
contamination attack to impair the channel estimation process
at the base station [24]. Due to the channel hardening effect
caused by large antenna arrays, it is difficult to exploit the
statistical fluctuations of fading channels to safeguard the
transmission. Then, the beamforming direction misled by
the pilot contamination attack can significantly enhance the
performance of the eavesdropper. This results in a serious
secrecy threat in time division duplex (TDD)-based massive
MIMO systems [24].
Prior works on the pilot contamination attack have studied
mechanisms for enhancing the eavesdropper’s performance
[25–28]. Other works propose various approaches for detect-
ing the pilot contamination attack [29–33]. Although these
schemes can detect a pilot contamination attack with high
probability, [29–33] do not provide an effective transmission
scheme in the presence of a pilot contamination attack. For
secure communication under a pilot contamination attack, the
authors of [34] propose a secret key agreement protocol for
single-cell multi-user massive MIMO systems. An estimator
2for the base station (BS) is designed to evaluate the resulting
information leakage. Then, the BS and the desired users
perform secure communication by adjusting the length of the
secret key based on the estimated information leakage. Other
works have studied how to combat the pilot contamination
attack. The authors of [35] investigate the pilot contamination
attack problem for single-cell multi-user massive MIMO sys-
tems over independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) fading
channels. The eavesdropper is assumed to only know the pilot
signal set whose size scales polynomially with the number
of transmit antennas. For each transmission, the desired users
randomly select certain pilot signals from this set, which are
unknown to the eavesdropper. In this case, it is proved that
the impact of the pilot contamination attack can be eliminated
as the number of transmit antennas goes to infinity. Under the
same pilot allocation protocol, the authors of [36] and [37]
respectively propose a random channel training scheme and a
jamming-resistant scheme employing an unused pilot sequence
to combat the pilot contamination attack and to maintain
secure communication. Moreover, by exploiting an additional
random sequence, which is transmitted by the legitimate users
but is unknown to the eavesdropper, an effective blind channel
estimation method and a secure beamforming scheme are
developed to realize reliable transmission in [38].
However, all the above-mentioned methods rely on a key
assumption: some form of an additional pilot signal protocol
which is unknown to the eavesdropper is needed to combat
the pilot contamination attack. For the more pessimistic case
where the eavesdropper knows the desired users’ exact pilot
signal structure for each transmission1, the secrecy threat
caused by the pilot contamination attack in multi-cell multi-
user massive MIMO systems over correlated fading channels
is analyzed in [24]. Based on this analysis, three transmission
strategies for combating the pilot contamination attack are
proposed. Nevertheless, the designs in [24] are not able to
guarantee a high (or not even a non-zero) secrecy rate for
weakly correlated or i.i.d. fading channels when the power of
the eavesdropper pilot signal is much larger than that of the
users’ pilot signals.
In this paper, we investigate secure transmission for TDD
multi-cell multi-user massive MIMO systems impaired by
general correlated fading and a pilot contamination attack. We
assume the considered system performs first uplink training
followed by uplink and downlink data transmission phases.
The eavesdropper jams the uplink training phase and the uplink
data transmission phase and then eavesdrops the downlink data
transmission2 We utilize the data transmitted in the uplink
1We note that this case constitutes a worst-case scenario. Hence, if secure
communication can be achieved for this worst case, then secure communi-
cation can also be achieved for more optimistic settings as considered in
[36–38].
2We note that the pilot contamination attack presents a security threat only
for the downlink. In fact, in the uplink, if an eavesdropper transmits a strong
pilot signal in the uplink together with the legitimate users, it can at most jam
the reception of some users, and therefore disrupt coherent detection, but it
will not be able to improve its ability to eavesdrop the uplink traffic. Since
this paper studies the pilot contamination attack, we focus on downlink data
transmission. Secure uplink transmission is also relevant and is an interesting
topic for future work (not dedicated to the pilot contamination attack) but is
outside the scope of the present paper.
to aid the channel estimation at the BS. Then, based on the
estimated channels, the BS designs precoders for downlink
transmission.
This paper makes the following key contributions:
1) We prove that when the number of transmit antennas and
the amount of transmitted data both approach infinity,
the desired users’ and the eavesdropper’s signals lie in
different eigenspaces of the uplink received signal matrix
provided that their pilot signal powers are different.
Our results reveal that increasing the power gap be-
tween the desired users’ and the eavesdropper’s signals
is beneficial for separating the desired users and the
eavesdropper. This implies that when facing an active
attack, decreasing (instead of increasing) the desired
users’ signal power could be an effective approach for
enabling secrete communication.
2) Inspired by this observation, we propose a joint uplink
and downlink data-aided transmission scheme to combat
strong3 active attacks from an eavesdropper. Then, we
derive an asymptotic expression for the corresponding
achievable secrecy sum-rate. The derived expression
indicates that the impact of an active attack on uplink
transmission can be effectively eliminated by the pro-
posed design.
3) We specialize the asymptotic achievable secrecy sum-
rate expression to the case of i.i.d. fading channels. Par-
ticularly, for the classical MIMO eavesdropper wiretap
model, the derived expression indicates that the secrecy
rate exhibits a logarithmic growth with the number of
transmit antennas. This is the same growth rate as that
of the achievable rate of a typical point-to-point massive
MIMO system without eavesdropping.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the basic system model is introduced and the uplink
channel estimation is investigated. In Section III, the proposed
secure downlink transmission scheme is presented and an
asymptotic expression for the secrecy rate of the proposed
design is derived. Section IV discusses the special case of i.i.d.
fading in detail. Numerical results are provided in Section V,
and conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
Notation: Vectors are denoted by lower-case bold-face let-
ters; matrices are denoted by upper-case bold-face letters.
Superscripts (·)T , (·)∗, and (·)H stand for the matrix transpose,
conjugate, and conjugate-transpose operations, respectively.
We use tr(A) and A−1 to denote the trace and the inverse
of matrix A, respectively. diag {b} denotes a diagonal matrix
with the elements of vector b on its main diagonal. Diag {B}
denotes a diagonal matrix containing the diagonal elements of
matrix B on the main diagonal. The M ×M identity matrix
is denoted by IM , and the M × N all-zero matrix and the
N ×1 all-zero vector are denoted by 0. The fields of complex
and real numbers are denoted by C and R, respectively. E [·]
denotes statistical expectation. [A]mn denotes the element in
the mth row and nth column of matrix A. [a]m denotes the
3We refer to a pilot contamination attack as a strong pilot contamination
attack if the pilot signal power of the eavesdropper is much larger than that
of the users.
3mth entry of vector a. ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product.
x ∼ CN (0,RN) denotes a circularly symmetric complex
vector x ∈ CN×1 with zero mean and covariance matrix RN .
var(a) denotes the variance of random variable a. [x]
+
stands
for max {0, x}. a ≫ b means that a is much larger than b.
f ∈ o(x) means that f/x→ 0.
II. UPLINK TRANSMISSION
Throughout the paper, we adopt the following transmission
protocol. We assume the uplink transmission phase, compris-
ing uplink training and uplink data transmission, is followed
by a downlink data transmission phase.
We assume the main objective of the eavesdropper is to
eavesdrop the downlink data. Nevertheless, the eavesdrop-
per also attacks the uplink transmission phase to impair
the channel estimation at the BS. The resulting mismatched
channel estimation will increase the information leakage in the
subsequent downlink transmission. In the downlink transmis-
sion phase, the eavesdropper does not attack but focuses on
eavesdropping the data.
We study a multi-cell multi-user MIMO system with L+1
cells, cf. Figure 1. We assume an Nt-antenna BS and K
single-antenna users are present in each cell. The cells are
index by l = (0, . . . , L), where cell l = 0 is the cell of
interest. We assume an Ne-antenna active eavesdropper
4 is
located in the cell of interest and attempts to eavesdrop the
data intended for all users in the cell. The eavesdropper sends
pilot signals and artificial noise to interfere channel estimation
and uplink data transmission5, respectively. Let T and τ denote
the coherence time of the channel and the length of the pilot
signal, respectively. Then, for uplink transmission, the received
pilot signal matrix Ymp ∈ CNt×τ and the received data signal
matrix Ymd ∈ CNt×(T−τ) at the BS in cell m are given by
Ymp =
√
P0
K∑
k=1
hm0kω
T
k +
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
√
Plh
m
lkω
T
k
+
√
Pe
KNe
Hme We +N
m
p , (1)
Ymd =
√
P0
K∑
k=1
hm0kd
T
0k +
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
√
Plh
m
lkd
T
lk
+
√
Pe
Ne
Hme A+N
m
d , (2)
where P0, ωk ∈ Cτ×1, and d0k ∼ CN (0, IT−τ ) denote the
average transmit power, the pilot sequence, and the uplink
transmission data of the kth user in the cell of interest,
respectively. For simplicity of notation, we assume that all
users in a given cell use the same transmit power [19]. Using
similar techniques as presented in this paper, our results can
be easily extended to the case where the users in a cell
have different transmit powers. We assume that the users in
4An Ne-antenna eavesdropper is equivalent to Ne cooperating single-
antenna eavesdroppers.
5We note that if the eavesdropper only attacks the channel estimation phase
and remains silent during the uplink data transmission, then the impact of
this attack can be easily eliminated with the joint channel estimation and
data detection scheme in [15]. Therefore, a smart eavesdropper will attack
the entire uplink transmission.
different cells have different powers. It is assumed that the
sameK orthogonal pilot sequences are used in each cell where
ω
H
k ωk = τ and ω
H
k ωl = 0, k 6= l. We is the pilot attack sig-
nal of the eavesdropper. Pl and dlk denote the average transmit
power and the uplink transmission data of the kth user in the
lth cell, respectively. hplk ∼ CN (0,Rplk) denotes the channel
between the kth user in the lth cell and the BS in the pth cell,
where R
p
lk is the corresponding correlation matrix.H
l
e and Pe
denote the channel between the eavesdropper and the BS in the
lth cell and the average transmit power of the eavesdropper,
respectively. Hle ∼ CN
(
0,RlE,T ⊗RlE,R
)
represents the
channel between the eavesdropper and the BS in the lth cell,
where RlE,T and R
l
E,R are the corresponding transmit and
receive correlation matrices of the eavesdropper.Nmp ∈ CNt×τ
and Nmd ∈ CNt×(T−τ) are noise matrices whose columns are
i.i.d. Gaussian distributed with CN (0, N0INt).
During the training phase, the eavesdropper attacks all users
in the cell of interest. In this paper, we adopt the worst-
case assumption that for each transmission, the eavesdropper
knows the exact pilot sequence ωk of each user. Therefore,
it uses pilot attack sequences6 We =
∑K
k=1Wk [35], where
Wk = [ωk · · ·ωk]T ∈ CNt×τ . In the uplink data transmission
phase, the eavesdropper generates an artificial noise matrix
A ∈ CNt×T−τ , whose elements follows an i.i.d. standard
Gaussian distribution.
We define Y0 =
[
Y0p Y
0
d
]
and the eigenvalue
decomposition 1TNtY0Y
H
0 = [v1, · · · ,vNt ]Σ[v1, · · · ,vNt
]
H
, where the eigenvalues on the main diagonal of matrix
Σ are organized in ascending order. For the following, we
make the important assumption that due to the difference
in power7 between the eavesdroppers’ pilots and the
users’ pilots in the cell of interest and the large path loss
difference between the users in the cell of interest and the
users in the other cells [16], Petr
(
R0E,T
)
, P0tr
(
R00k
)
,
and Pltr
(
Rllk
)
have the relationship Petr
(
R0E,T
) ≫
P0tr
(
R00k
) ≫ Pltr (Rllk). Define tr (R0E,T )R0E,R = RE
and the eigenvalue decomposition RE = UEΛeU
H
E ,
where Λe = diag (Λ1 · · ·ΛNe). Let M = (L + 1)K + Ne
and vector (θ1, · · · , θM ) has the same elements as vector(
P1tr
(
R011
)
, · · · , PLtr
(
R0LK
)
, P0tr
(
R001
)
, · · · , P0tr
(
R00K
)
,
PeΛ1, · · ·PeΛNe) but with the elements organized in
ascending order such that index 1 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 · · · ≤ iK ≤ M
satisfies θik = P0tr
(
R00k
)
, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K . Define
V0eq = [vNt−M+i1 ,vNt−M+i2 , · · · ,vNt−M+iK ],
H0 =
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]
, and HI =[
h011, · · ·h01K , · · · ,h0L1, · · · ,h0LK
]
. Then, we have the
6If the eavesdropper is only interested in a particular user, then he can
perform a pilot contamination attack specifically for this user as in [24]. How-
ever, this pilot contamination precoding will not influence the proposed joint
uplink and downlink transmission scheme and the corresponding asymptotic
performance analysis.
7When the eavesdropper increases the pilot contamination attack power Pe,
the users in the cell of interest can intentionally decrease their pilot signal
power P0 to achieve a significant power gap between Pe and P0 based on
a power control mechanism. According to Appendix A, this is essential to
eliminate the impact of the active eavesdropper. If the eavesdropper does not
eavesdrop the signals in the cell in which it is located but the signals in one
of the other cells, then a power control mechanism for Pe and Pl is required
to combat the pilot contamination attack.
4Uplink pilots
  Contaminated pilots
Local Cell
BS User Eve
Fig. 1: Model of considered multi-cell massive MIMO system.
following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let Z0p =
1√
TNt
(
V0eq
)H
Y0p =
[z0p,1, · · · , z0p,K ] and H0eq = 1√TNt
(
V0eq
)H
H0 =
[heq,01, · · · ,heq,0K ]. Then, when T → ∞ and Nt → ∞, the
received signal z = vec (Z0p) and the minimum mean square
error (MMSE) estimate ĥeq,0k of heq,0k based on z are given
by
z =
√
P0
K∑
t=1
(ωt ⊗ IK)heq,0t + n, (3)
hˆeq,0k=
√
P0V
0
eqR
0
0k
(
V0eq
)H
×
(
N0IK + τP0V
0
eqR
0
0k
(
V0eq
)H)−1 (√
P0τV
0
eqh
0
0k + neq
)
,
(4)
where
n =

(
V0eq
)H
n0p1
...(
V0eq
)H
n0pτ
 (5)
and n0pt in (5) is the tth column of N
0
p. neq = V
0
eqn˜eq and
n˜eq ∼ CN (0, τN0INt).
Proof. Please refer to Appendix A.
Remark 1: The basic intuition behind Theorem 1 is that
when T → ∞ and Nt → ∞, each channel tends to be an
eigenvector of the received signal matrix. As a result, we
project the received signal matrix along the eigenspace which
corresponds to the desired users’ channel. In this case, the
impact of the strong active attack can be effectively eliminated,
cf. (4).
Remark 2: It should be noted that when Nt → ∞,
Petr
(
R0E,T
)
> P0tr
(
R00k
)
> Pltr
(
Rllk
)
is enough to
distinguish the eavesdropper, the users in the cell of inter-
est, and the users in the other cells as shown in Appendix
A. However, when Nt is large but not infinite, we require
Petr
(
R0E,T
)≫ P0tr (R00k)≫ Pltr (Rllk) to achieve a good
secrecy performance under the pilot contamination attack.
Remark 3: In Theorem 1, we assume that the coherence time
of the channel is significantly larger than the symbol duration
[16]. This assumption can be justified based on the expression
for the coherence time in [16, Eq. (1)]. For typical speeds of
mobile users and typical symbol durations, the coherence time
spans several hundred symbol durations.
Remark 4: The simulation results in Section V indicate
that a sufficient power gap between P0 and Pe can guarantee
a good secrecy performance when the number of transmit
antennas and the coherence time of the channel are large but
finite. We note that allocating a high power to the desired users
to combat a strong active attack is not necessary. In contrast,
a large gap between P0tr
(
R00k
)
and Petr
(
R0E,T
)
is essential
5to approach the channel estimation result in Theorem 1. This
implies that decreasing the transmit power of the desired users
can be an effective strategy to ensure secure transmission
under a strong active attack. As shown in Figure 5 and Figure
6 in Section V, as long as ρ = Pe/(P0K) is larger than 0
dB, the proposed design is able to achieve a good secrecy
performance in all considered scenarios.
Based on Theorem 1, in the next section, we can design the
precoders for downlink transmission.
III. DOWNLINK TRANSMISSION
In this section, we consider the downlink transmission
phase. We assume that the BSs in all L + 1 cells perform
channel estimation according to Theorem 1 by replacing
ĥeq,0k , heq,0k , P0, and V
0
eq by ĥeq,lk , heq,lk, Pl, and V
l
eq ,
respectively. Then, the lth BS designs the transmit signal as
follows
xl =
√
P
K∑
k=1
tlkslk, l = 0, · · · , L, (6)
where P is the downlink transmission power, tlk =(
Vleq
)H hˆeq,lk
‖hˆeq,lk‖ , and slk is the downlink transmitted signal
for the kth user in the lth cell.
We note that unlike for the scheme in [24], for the proposed
precoder design, the base station does not need to know the full
statistical channel state information of the eavesdropper. As
long as Petr
(
R0E,T
)≫ P0tr (R00k)≫ Pltr (Rllk) holds, the
base station can identify the relevant columns in 1TNtY0Y
H
0 =
[v1, · · · ,vNt ]Σ[v1, · · · ,vNt ] for computation ofV0eq . For the
legitimate users in the cell of interest, the BS needs to know
their covariance matrices R00k to perform channel estimation,
see Theorem 1.
Because each user in the cell of interest has the risk of being
eavesdropped, based on [39] and [24], the achievable ergodic
(the codewords are sent over a large number of fading blocks)
secrecy sum-rate can be expressed as
Rsec =
K∑
k=1
[Rk − Cevek ]+ (7)
where Rk and C
eve
k denote an achievable ergodic rate between
the BS and the kth user and the ergodic capacity between the
BS and the eavesdropper seeking to decode the information
of the kth user, respectively.
The received signal y0k at the kth user in the cell of interest
is given by
y0k =
L∑
l=0
(
h0lk
)H
xl + nd
=
√
P
(
h00k
)H (
V0eq
)H hˆeq,0k∥∥∥hˆeq,0k∥∥∥s0k
+
√
P
(
h00k
)H (
V0eq
)H K∑
t=1,t6=k
hˆeq,0t∥∥∥hˆeq,0t∥∥∥s0t
+
√
P
L∑
l=1
(
h0lk
)H (
Vleq
)H K∑
t=1
hˆeq,lt∥∥∥hˆeq,lt∥∥∥slt + nd, (8)
where nd ∼ CN (0, N0d) is the noise affecting the received
downlink signal.
The achievable ergodic rate Rk is given by
Rk = E [log (1 + γk)] , (9)
where
γk =
∣∣∣g00k,k∣∣∣2
N0d +
K∑
t=1,t6=k
∣∣∣g00t,k∣∣∣2 + L∑
l=1
K∑
t=1
∣∣∣g0lt,k∣∣∣2 , (10)
and g0lt,k =
√
P
(
h0lk
)H (
Vleq
)H hˆeq,lt
‖hˆeq,lt‖ .
The ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper for decoding the
information intended for user k, Cevek , is given by
8
Cevek = E
[
log2
(
1 + P (t0k)
H
H0eQ
−1
k
(
H0e
)H
t0k
)]
, (11)
where
Qk =
(
H0e
)H K∑
p=1,p6=k
t0t(t0k)
H
H0e
+
L∑
l=1
(
Hle
)H K∑
k=1
tlk(tlk)
H
Hle +N0dINe . (12)
Based on (7), (9), and (11), we obtain the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 2. For the considered multi-cell multi-user massive
MIMO system, an asymptotic achievable secrecy sum-rate for
the transmit signal design in (6) is given by
Rsec, ach
Nt→∞→
K∑
k=1
log (1 + γ¯k) , (13)
where
γ¯k =
Pa00k,2
a00k,1
(
N0d + P
K∑
t=1,t6=k
b0
0t,k
a0
0t,1
+ P
L∑
l=1
K∑
t=1
cllt,k
allt,1
) ,
(14)
allt,1 = P0τ
P0τ
 K∑
p=1,p6=t
[
Allt,4
]
pp
tr
(
RlltR
l
lp
)
+
[
Allt,4
]
tt
tr2
(
Rllt
)]
+N0
K∑
p=1
[
Allt,4
]
pp
tr
(
Rllk
))
,
(15)
Allt,4 = A
l
lt,3diag
(
tr
(
Rll1
)
, · · · , (RllK)) , (16)
Allt,3 =
(
Allt,1
)2(
Allt,2
)2
, Allt,2 =
(
N0IK + τP0A
l
lt,1
)−1
,
(17)
Allt,1 =
diag
 tr (Rll1Rllt)
tr
(
Rll1
) , · · · , tr
((
Rllt
)2)
tr
(
Rllt
) , · · · , tr (RlltRllK)
tr
(
RllK
)
 ,
l = 0, 1, · · · , L, t = 1, · · · ,K, (18)
8It should be noted that here we consider the practical scenario where the
eavesdropper is not able to decode and cancel the signals of the intra-cell
and inter-cell users from the received signal. For a more pessimistic setting,
where the eavesdropper has access to the data of all intra-cell and inter-cell
interfering users, we can also obtain a lower bound on the ergodic secrecy
rate as in [24]. However, the two expressions exhibit no difference as far as
the subsequent analysis is concerned since the eavesdropper’s rate will be
suppressed to zero based on the proposed data-aided transmission scheme.
6a00k,2 = P0
(
P0τ
2
([
A00k,5
]
kk
tr2
(
R00k
)
+
K∑
t=1,t6=k
[
A00k,5
]
tt
tr
(
R00kR
0
0t
)2

+P0N0τ
([
A00k,4
]
kk
tr2
(
R00k
)
+
K∑
t=1,t6=k
[
A00k,4
]
tt
tr
(
R00kR
0
0t
) , k = 1, · · · ,K,
(19)
Allt,5 = A
l
lt,2A
l
lt,1diag
(
tr
(
R001
)
, · · · , (R00K))
= Allt,2A
l
lt,1Rl, l = 0, 1, · · · , L, t = 1, · · · ,K,
(20)
b00t,k =
(
P0τtr
(
R00k
) [
A00t,5
]
kk
)2
tr
(
R00kR
0
0t
)
+ P0τN0tr
3
(
R00k
) ([
A00t,5
]
kk
)2
, (21)
cllt,k=PIτN0
(
K∑
p=1
[
Allt,5
]2
pp
tr
(
R0lkR
l
lp
)
tr
(
Rllp
)
+
K∑
p=1
K∑
m=1,m 6=p
[
Allt,5
]
pp
[
Allt,5
]
mm
tr
(
RllpR
0
lkR
l
lm
) .
(22)
Proof. Please refer to Appendix B.
Remark 5: Theorem 2 is a unified expression which is valid
for arbitrary K and L and general correlated channels. Also,
Theorem 2 indicates that when Nt tends to infinity, the impact
of the active attack from the eavesdropper vanishes if the
proposed joint uplink and downlink transmission approach is
adopted.
Remark 6: Although the rigorous theoretical analysis in
Theorem 2 requires that both Nt and T tend to infinity, our
simulation results in Section V indicate that even for short
packet communication (e.g., T = 128) and a finite number of
transmit antennas (e.g., Nt = 64), the proposed joint uplink
and downlink transmission approach is still able to provide a
good secrecy performance under a strong pilot contamination
attack.
Remark 7: It is important to note that the proposed scheme
does not require joint channel estimation and data detection
or an additional pilot sequence hopping mechanism. In fact,
the uplink data only has to be exploited to generate matrix
V0eq . Then, simply projecting the transmit signal along the
eigenspace, V0eq , is enough to effectively combat the strong
pilot contamination attack without any further computational
operations or extra resources.
IV. THE I.I.D. FADING CASE
In order to obtain more insightful results, in this section,
we analyze the asymptotic achievable secrecy rate of massive
MIMO systems for the i.i.d. fading case. For general multi-
cell multi-user massive MIMO systems, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. For multi-cell multi-user massive MIMO systems
with i.i.d. fading where R
p
lk = β
p
lkINt
9, the asymptotic
achievable secrecy sum-rate for the transmit signal design in
(6) is given by
Rsec, iid
Nt→∞→
K∑
k=1
log (1 + γ¯k,iid) , (23)
where
γ¯k,iid =
Pa1k,iid
N0d + P
K∑
t=1,t6=k
a2kt,iid + P
L∑
l=1
K∑
t=1
a3ktl,iid
,
(24)
a1k,iid =
P0τ
(
β00kNt + β
0
0k (K − 1)
)2
+N0
(
Ntβ
0
0k + (K − 1)β00k
)
P0τβ00k (Nt +K − 1) +KN0
,
(25)
a2kt,iid =
P0τNtβ
0
0kβ
0
0t +N0Ntβ
0
0k
(P0τβ00t (Nt +K − 1) +KN0)
, (26)
a3ktl,iid =
PIτNtβ
0
lkβ
0
lt + β
0
lkN0
(
K+K(K−1)Nt
)
PIτβllt (Nt +K − 1) +KN0
. (27)
Proof. The theorem can be proved by substituting R
p
lk =
βplkINt into (13) and performing some simplifications.
Remark 8: Theorem 3 indicates that the secrecy rate is
a monotonically increasing function of the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) SNR = P/N0d even in the presence of an
active eavesdropper. This behaviour is in sharp contrast with
the scheme proposed in [24, Theorem 3], for which the
secrecy rate decreases for increasing SNR in the high SNR
regime if all the available power at the BS is allocated to
the information-carrying signals. For the proposed data-aided
secure massive MIMO transmission, V0eq naturally forms an
asymptotic orthogonal space to the eavesdropper’s channel. As
a result, the null space of the transmit correlation matrix of
the eavesdropper’s channel [24] is not essential anymore to
combat the strong pilot contamination attack. The proposed
joint uplink and downlink transmission scheme can guarantee
reliable secure communication even for i.i.d. fading channels.
To provide more insights into the impact of the proposed
scheme on secure communication in massive MIMO systems,
we simplify the system model further to the single-cell single-
user case. Based on Theorem 3 and [40, Corollary 1], we have
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For a single-cell single-user system (L = 0,K =
1) with i.i.d. fading, the asymptotic achievable secrecy rate for
the transmit signal design in (6) is given by
Rsec, iid, single = log
(
1 +
PNtβ
0
01
N0d
+ o(Nt)
)
. (28)
Proof. By setting L = 0, K = 1 in (23) and considering the
asymptotic case, we obtain (28).
Remark 9: The asymptotic secrecy rate in (28) grows
logarithmically with the number of transmit antennas. This is
9It should be noted that here we do not require the channels of the
eavesdropper to be i.i.d., i.e., RlE,T and R
l
E,R can be arbitrary matrices.
7identical to the growth rate of the asymptotic rate for single-
user massive MIMO systems without eavesdropper. This is
in sharp contrast to the conclusions in [24, Theorem 9],
where secure communication is unachievable for the single-
cell single-user i.i.d. fading case for high pilot contamination
attack powers. Corollary 1 reveals that by exploiting the
uplink transmission data, we can find a promising solution
that facilitates secure communication for i.i.d. fading massive
MIMO systems with active eavesdropper.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to evaluate
the proposed scheme and the obtained analytical results. To
the best of our knowledge, although there has been a large
amount of research on active eavesdropping in the past few
years [35–38], most of these schemes require some additional
pilot signal protocol which is unknown to the eavesdropper
to combat the pilot contamination attack. These schemes are
not compatible with the assumptions in our paper, where the
eavesdropper perfectly knows the desired users’ exact pilot
signal structure for each transmission. Hence, we compare
the proposed scheme with matched filter precoding and AN
generation (we refer to this design as MF-AN scheme) and
the null space scheme in [24], which both also do not require
a modified pilot protocol.
We define SNR = P/N0d and set P0 = P1 = ... = PL.
Also, we define10ρ = Pe/(P0K). We consider both correlated
fading channels and i.i.d. fading channels. For correlated
fading channels, a uniform linear array is used at the BS with
half a wavelength antenna spacing. The angle of arrival (AoA)
interval is A = [−θb, θb]. The channel power angle spectrum
is modeled as a truncated Laplacian distribution [41]
p (θ) =
1
√
2σ
(
1− e−√2pi/σ
)e−√2‖θ−θ¯‖σ , (29)
where σ and θ¯ are the angular spread and the mean AoA of the
channel, respectively. The angular spread σ in (29) is assumed
to be identical for the channels of all users and the eavesdrop-
per and is set to be σ = pi/2. The mean channel AoAs, θ¯, of
all users and the eavesdropper in (29) are generated at random.
Based on [41, Eq. (3.14)], we generate the channel transmit
correlation matrices of all users, R
p
lk, and the eavesdropper,
RlE,T . Moreover, we impose a channel power normalization
such that the trace of the channel transmit correlation matrix
between a user and the BS in its own cell and between a
user and the BSs in the other cells are equal to Nt and
βNt, respectively. We set β = 0.1. The receive correlation
matrices of the eavesdropper, RlE,R, are generated using the
exponential correlation model
[
RlE,R
]
i,j
= ϕ|i−j|, ϕ ∈ (0, 1),
where ϕ is generated at random. For i.i.d. fading channels,
we set Rllk = β
l
lkINt , R
p
lk = β
p
lkINt , R
l
E,T = β
l
eINt ,
and RlE,R = INe . Here, we set β
l
lk = 1 and β
p
lk = 0.1,
k = 1, · · · ,K , l = 1, · · · , L, p = 1, · · · , L, p 6= l. Also, we
set β0e = 1 and β
l
e = 0.1, l = 2, · · · , L. Throughout this
10It should be noted that the eavesdropper attacks the K users simultane-
ously. For each user, the pilot contamination attack power is Pe/K . Hence,
we define ρ = Pe/(P0K).
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Fig. 2: MSE vs. T for L = 3, K = 5, Nt = 128, ρ = 1 dB,
τ = 64, N0 = 1, correlated fading with θb = pi, and different
P0.
section, we assume Ne = 2. Table I summarizes the values of
main parameters used in the simulations in each figure.
Figure 2 shows the normalized mean squared error (MSE)∑K
k=1 ‖ hˆeq,0k −V0eqh00k ‖2 / ‖ V0eqh00k ‖2 versus (vs.) T
for the MMSE estimation scheme in Theorem 1 for L = 3,
K = 5, Nt = 128, ρ = 0 dB, τ = 64, N0 = 1, correlated
fading with θb = pi, and different P0. We observe from
Figure 2 that the MSE is below 10−3 for all considered
P0 and T . This demonstrates that the proposed data-aided
estimation method is an effective approach to distinguish the
actual channel of each user from the eavesdropper’s channel
under the pilot contamination attack.
Figure 3 shows the secrecy rate performance vs. SNR for
the proposed scheme for L = 3, K = 5, T = 1024, τ = 64, ρ
= 20 dB, P0 = 10, N0 = 1, correlated fading with θb = pi, and
different Nt. We observe from Figure 3 that the asymptotic
secrecy rates in Theorem 2 provide a good approximation for
the exact secrecy rates. The accuracy of the approximation
increases with the number of transmit antennas as expected.
Also, we observe from Figure 3 that the secrecy rate is a
monotonically increasing function of the SNR even under a
strong pilot contamination attack.
Figure 4 shows the secrecy rate performance of the proposed
scheme vs. Nt for L = 0, K = 1, ρ = 20 dB, P0 = 10,
N0 = 1, i.i.d. fading, and different SNRs. We set τ = 64 and
T = 16Nt. We observe from Figure 4 that the secrecy rates
scale logarithmically with the number of transmit antennas,
as predicted by Corollary 1. Figure 4 also shows that the
theoretical secrecy rates provide good approximations for the
exact secrecy rates for the i.i.d. fading case.
Figure 5 shows the exact secrecy rate performance vs. ρ for
the proposed scheme and the null space (NS) scheme [24]
for L = 3, K = 5, Nt = 128, ρ = 20 dB, P0 = 10,
N0 = 1, SNR = 20 dB, correlated fading with θb = pi,
and different T . We observe from Figure 5 that even for
short packet communication when T = 128, the proposed
8TABLE I: Values of main parameters used in simulations.
Parameter Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4 Fig. 5 Fig. 6 Fig. 7
L 3 3 0 3 3 3
K 5 5 1 5 5 5
Nt 128 128, 64 64–644 128 128 128
T 128–1024 1024 16 Nt 128, 1024 128, 1024 1024
τ 64 64 64 8, 64 8, 64 8
P0 1, 10, 100 10 10 10 10 10
N0 1 1 1 1 1 1
ρ 1 dB 20 dB 20 dB 0–20 dB 0–20 dB 10 dB
SNR None -20–26 dB 10, 20 dB 20 dB 20 dB 15 dB
θb pi pi None pi None pi/20–pi
θ¯ Random Random None Random None Random
σ pi/2 pi/2 None pi/2 None pi/2
β 0.1 0.1 None 0.1 0.1 0.1
βl
lk
1 1 1 1 1 1
βp
lk
0.1 0.1 None 0.1 0.1 0.1
Ne 2 2 2 2 2 2
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Fig. 3: Secrecy rate vs. SNR for L = 3, K = 5, T = 1024,
τ = 64, ρ = 20 dB, P0 = 10, N0 = 1, correlated fading with
θb = pi, and different Nt.
scheme can achieve an obvious secrecy performance gain
compared to the null space scheme. Also, we observe from
Figure 5 that when the power of the active attack is strong, the
null space scheme maintains an almost constant secrecy rate.
However, as ρ increases, the gap between P0R
0
0k and PeΛi
increases. Therefore, the secrecy rates of the proposed scheme
increase with ρ. Moreover, Figure 5 reveals that increasing
T is beneficial for the secrecy performance of the proposed
scheme.
Figure 6 shows the exact secrecy rate performance vs. ρ for
the proposed scheme and the MF-AN scheme [24] for L = 3,
K = 5, Nt = 128, ρ = 20 dB, P0 = 10, N0 = 1, SNR = 20
dB, i.i.d. fading, and different T . We observe from Figure 6
that when the power of the active attack is strong, the MF-
AN scheme cannot provide a non-zero secrecy rate. However,
our proposed scheme performs well in the entire considered
range of ρ. When the power of the active attack is close to
the power of the desired user’s pilot signal where ρ is small,
the asymptotic estimation error in Theorem 1 increases. As a
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Fig. 4: Secrecy rate vs. Nt for L = 0, K = 1, ρ = 20 dB,
P0 = 10, N0 = 1, i.i.d. fading, and different SNRs.
result, our proposed scheme suffers a slight performance loss
comparing to the MF-AN scheme.
Figure 7 shows the exact secrecy rate performance vs. θb
for the proposed scheme, the null space scheme, and the MF-
AN scheme for L = 3, K = 5, Nt = 128, T = 1024,
τ = 64, ρ = 10 dB, P0 = 10, N0 = 1, SNR = 15 dB,
and correlated fading. It should be noted that the rank of the
correlation matrix generated by (29) decreases as θb decreases.
This means when θb is small, the channel is highly correlated.
We observe from Figure 7 that the proposed scheme provides
the best secrecy performance throughout the entire considered
range of θb. Also, we observe from Figure 7 that a small value
of θb is beneficial for the null space scheme since the rank of
the eavesdropper’s transmit correlation matrix is low.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a data-aided secure trans-
mission scheme for general correlated fading channels and
multi-cell multi-user massive MIMO systems which are un-
der a strong active attack. We exploit the received uplink
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Fig. 5: Secrecy rate vs. ρ for L = 3, K = 5, Nt = 128,
P0 = 10, N0 = 1, SNR = 20 dB, correlated fading with
θb = pi, different schemes, and different T .
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Fig. 6: Secrecy rate vs. ρ for L = 3, K = 5, Nt = 128,
P0 = 10, N0 = 1, SNR = 20 dB, i.i.d. fading, different
schemes, and different T .
data signal for joint uplink channel estimation and secure
downlink data transmission. We show analytically that when
the number of transmit antennas and the length of the data
vector both approach infinity, decreasing (instead of increas-
ing) the desired user’s pilot signal power to generate an
obvious gap to the eavesdropper’s pilot signal power could
be an effective approach for distinguishing the desired user’s
and the eavesdropper’s channels. Based on this, we propose
an effective approach to eliminate the impact of an active
pilot contamination attack. For the proposed data-aided secure
downlink transmission scheme, we obtain a general asymptotic
achievable secrecy sum-rate expression. Interestingly, we re-
veal that for the special case of the classical MIMO wiretap
channel, the obtained expression exhibits the same scaling
law as the achievable rate of a single-user massive MIMO
system without eavesdropping. Numerical results validate our
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Fig. 7: Secrecy rate vs. θb for L = 3, K = 5, Nt = 128,
T = 1024, τ = 64, ρ = 10 dB, P0 = 10, N0 = 1, SNR = 15
dB, correlated fading, and different schemes.
theoretical analysis and demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed scheme to mitigate strong active attacks compared
to matched filter precoding with artificial noise generation and
a null space based scheme.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We define Ω0 = [ω1, · · · ,ωK ]T , D0 =√
P0 [d01, · · · ,d0K ]T , ΩL =
[√
P1Ω
T
0 , · · · ,
√
PLΩ
T
0
]T
, DL
=
[√
P1d11, · · · ,
√
P1d1K , · · · ,
√
PLdL1, · · · ,
√
PLdLK
]T
,
X0 =
[√
P0Ω0 D0
]
, XI = [ΩL DL],
Xe =
[√
Pe
KNe
K∑
k=1
Wk
√
Pe
Ne
A
]
.
Based on (1) and (2), the received signal Y0 can be re-
expressed as
Y0 = H0X0 +HIXI +H
0
eXe +N (30)
where N =
[
N0p N
0
d
]
.
For massive MIMO with correlated fading, when Nt →∞,
we have
1
Nt
HH0 H0 =
1
Nt

(
h001
)H
h001 · · ·
(
h00K
)H
h001
...
. . .
...(
h001
)H
h00K · · ·
(
h00K
)H
h00K
 .
(31)
Based on [40, Corollary 1], we obtain
1
Nt
HH0 H0
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt

tr
(
R001
)
0 · · · 0
0
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 tr (R00K)

=
1
Nt
R0. (32)
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Similarly, we have
1
Nt
HHI HI
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt

tr
(
R011
)
0 · · · 0
0
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 tr (R0LK)

=
1
Nt
RI . (33)
Also, based on [42, Eq. (102)], we have
1
Nt
[
HHe He
]
ij
=
1
Nt
(
h0E,i
)H
h0E,j
= eHi
(
R0E,R
)1/2(
G0E
)H(
R0E,T
)1/2
× (R0E,T )1/2G0E(R0E,R)1/2eHj
= tr
(
eHi
(
R0E,R
)1/2(
G0E
)H(
R0E,T
)1/2(
R0E,T
)1/2
× G0E
(
R0E,R
)1/2
ej
)
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
tr
((
R0E,R
)1/2
eje
H
i
(
R0E,R
)1/2)
tr
(
R0E,T
)
=
1
Nt
{
R0E,R
}
ij
tr
(
R0E,T
)
(34)
where h0E,i denotes the ith column of matrix He, G
0
E ∼
CN (0, INt ⊗ INe), and ei is a Nt × 1 vector with the ith
element being one and the other elements being zero.
As a result, we have
1
Nt
HHe He
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
R0E,Rtr
(
R0E,T
)
=
1
Nt
RE. (35)
When T →∞, based on [40, Corollary 1], we have
1
T
X0X
H
0
T→∞→ P0IK , (36)
1
T
XIX
H
I
T→∞→ PIILK , (37)
1
T
XeX
H
e
T→∞→ PeINe . (38)
Then, we obtain (39) given at the top of the next page.
Based on [40, Corollary 1], we obtain (40) given at the top
of next page from (39).
Now, we re-write (40) as (41) given at the top of the next
page.
We define
UY =
[
UW HIR
−1/2
I HeR
−1/2
E H0R
−1/2
0
]
(42)
where UW ∈ CNt×(Nt−M) has orthogonal columns.
Based on (32)–(35), we know
1
Nt
UHY UY
Nt→∞→ INt . (43)
From (39)–(43), we know that for T →∞, Nt →∞, UY
is the right singular matrix of Y0. Therefore, we obtain
Z0p =
1√
TNt
(
V0eq
)H
Y0p
Nt→∞→ 1√
TNt
(
V0eq
)H√
P0Ω0X0
+
1√
TNt
(
V0eq
)H
N0p. (44)
Define z = vec (Z0p), where Z0p is defined in Theorem 1.
From (44), we can re-express the equivalent received signal
during the pilot transmission phase as follows
z =
√
P0
K∑
t=1
(ωt ⊗ IK)heq,0t + n (45)
where
n =

(
V0eq
)H
n0p1
...(
V0eq
)H
n0pτ
 (46)
and n0pt in (46) is the tth column of N
0
p.
Based on (45), the MMSE estimate of heq,0k is given by
hˆeq,0k =
√
P0V0R
0
0kV
H
0 (ωk ⊗ IK)H
×
(
N0IKτ + P0
K∑
t=1
(ωk ⊗ IK)V0R00tVH0 (ωk ⊗ IK)H
)−1
z
=
√
P0V0R
0
0kV
H
0
(
N0IK + τP0V0R
0
0kV
H
0
)−1
×
(√
P0τheq,0k + (ωk ⊗ IK)Hn
)
. (47)
For the noise term in (47), we have
(ωk ⊗ IK)Hn =
(
V0eq
)H τ∑
t=1
ω∗ktn
0
pt
=
(
V0eq
)H
n˜eq = neq (48)
where ωkt is the tth element of ωk.
Combining (47) and (48) completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
From (40), we know(
V0eq
)H
= H0R
−1/2
0 =
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]
R
−1/2
0 , (49)(
Vleq
)H
= HlR
−1/2
l =
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]
R
−1/2
l . (50)
First, we consider∣∣g00k,k∣∣2 = P
(
h00k
)H (
Vleq
)H
hˆeq,0khˆ
H
eq,0kV
l
eqh
0
0k∥∥∥hˆeq,0k∥∥∥2 . (51)
Based on (4), we have∥∥∥hˆeq,0k∥∥∥2 = P0(√P0τV0eqh00k +V0eqn˜eq)H
×
(
N0IK + τP0V
0
eqR
0
0k
(
V0eq
)H)−1
V0eqR
0
0k
(
V0eq
)H
×V0eqR00k
(
V0eq
)H(
N0IK + τP0V
0
eqR
0
0k
(
V0eq
)H)−1
×
(√
P0τV
0
eqh
0
0k +V
0
eqn˜eq
)
. (52)
Based on (49) and [40, Corollary 1], we have
1
Nt
V0eqR
0
0k
(
V0eq
)H
(53)
=
1
Nt
R
−1/2
0
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]H
R00k
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]
R
−1/2
0
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
R
−1/2
0 diag
(
tr
(
R001R
0
0k
)
, · · · , tr
((
R00k
)2)
, · · · , tr (R001R00K))R−1/20
=
1
Nt
diag
tr (R001R00k)
tr (R001)
· · ·
tr
((
R00k
)2)
tr (R00k)
· · · tr
(
R00kR
0
0K
)
tr (R00K)

= A00k,1. (54)
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1
NtT
YYH
Nt→∞,T→∞→ 1
NtT
H0X0X
H
0 H
H
0 +
1
NtT
HIXIX
H
I H
H
I +
1
NtT
HeXeX
H
e H
H
e +
N0
Nt
INt
=
1
Nt
[
UW HIR
−1/2
I HeR
−1/2
E H0R
−1/2
0
]

N0INt−M 0 · · · 0
0
R
1/2
I XIX
H
I R
1/2
I
T +N0I(L−1)K
. . .
...
...
. . . R
1/2
E XeX
H
e R
1/2
E
T +N0INe 0
0 · · · 0 R
1/2
0
X0X
H
0
R
1/2
0
T +N0IK


UHW
R
−1/2
I H
H
I
R
−1/2
E H
H
e
R
−1/2
0 H
H
0
 . (39)
1
NtT
YYH
Nt→∞,T→∞→ 1
Nt
[
UW HIR
−1/2
I HeR
−1/2
E H0R
−1/2
0
]

N0INt−M 0 · · · 0
0 PIRI +N0ILK
. . .
...
...
. . . PeRe +N0INe 0
0 · · · 0 P0R0 +N0IK


UHW
R
−1/2
I H
H
I
R
−1/2
E H
H
e
R
−1/2
0 H
H
0
 . (40)
1
NtT
YYH
Nt→∞,T→∞→ = 1
Nt
[
UW HIR
−1/2
I HeR
−1/2
E UE H0R
−1/2
0
]

N0INt−M 0 · · · 0
0 PIRI +N0I(L−1)K
. . .
...
...
. . . PeΛe +N0INe 0
0 · · · 0 P0R0 +N0IK


UHW
R
−1/2
I H
H
I
UHER
−1/2
E H
H
e
R
−1/2
0 H
H
0
 . (41)
By substituting (54) into (52) and simplifying, we have
1
Nt
∥∥∥hˆeq,0k∥∥∥2 = 1
Nt
P0
(√
P0τV
0
eqh
0
0k +V
0
eqn˜eq
)H
A00k,3
×
(√
P0τV
0
eqh
0
0k +V
0
eqn˜eq
)
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
P0
(
P0τ
2
(
h00k
)H (
V0eq
)H
A00k,3h
0
0k
+(n˜eq)
H (
V0eq
)H
A00k,3V
0
eqn˜eq
)
, (55)
where A00k,3 is defined in (17).
For the first term on the right hand side of (55), we obtain
1
Nt
(
h00k
)H (
V0eq
)H
A00k,3V
0
eqh
0
0k
=
1
Nt
(
h00k
)H [
h001, · · ·h00K
]
R
−1/2
0 A
0
0k,3
×R−1/20
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]H
h00k
=
1
Nt
 K∑
t=1,t6=k
(
h00k
)H
h00t
[
A00k,4
]
tt
(
h00t
)H
h00k (56)
+
(
h00k
)H
h00k
[
A00k,4
]
kk
(
h00k
)H
h00k
]
, (57)
where A00k,4 is defined in (17).
Based on [40, Corollary 1], we obtain
1
Nt
(
h00k
)H (
V0eq
)H
A00k,3V
0
eqh
0
0k
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
 K∑
t=1,t6=k
[
A00k,4
]
tt
tr
(
R00kh
0
0t
(
h00t
)H)
+
[
A00k,4
]
kk
tr2
(
R00k
)]
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
 K∑
t=1,t6=k
[
A00k,4
]
tt
tr
(
R00kR
0
0t
)
+
[
A00k,4
]
kk
tr2
(
R00k
)]
. (58)
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For the second term on the right hand side of (55), we have
1
Nt
(n˜eq)
H (
V0eq
)H
A00k,3V
0
eqn˜eq
Nt→∞→ (59)
1
Nt
τN0tr
((
V0eq
)H
A00k,3
(
V0eq
))
=
1
Nt
τN0
× tr
([
h001, · · ·h00K
]
R
−1/2
0 A
0
0k,3R
−1/2
0
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]H)
=
1
Nt
τN0
K∑
t=1
[
A00k,4
]
tt
tr
(
h00t
(
h00t
)H)
=
1
Nt
τN0
K∑
t=1
[
A00k,4
]
tt
tr
(
R00t
)
. (60)
Combining (55)–(60) yields
1
Nt
∥∥∥hˆeq,0k∥∥∥2 Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
a00k,1, (61)
where a00k,1 is defined in (15).
For the numerator in (51), we have (62) given at the top of
the next page, where A00k,1 and A
0
0k,2 are defined in (18) and
(17), respectively.
According to the definition of V0eq in (49), we obtain
1
Nt
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
A00k,2A
0
0k,1V
0
eqh
0
0k
=
1
Nt
(
h00k
)H [
h001, · · ·h00K
]
R
−1/2
0 A
0
0k,2A
0
0k,1
×R−1/20
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]H
h00k
=
1
Nt
K∑
t=1
(
h00k
)H
h00t
[
A00k,5
]
tt
(
h00t
)H
h00k. (63)
We can further simplify (63) as follows:
1
Nt
[
A00k,5
]
tt
(
h00k
)H
h00t
(
h00t
)H
h00k
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
[
A00k,5
]
tt
tr
(
h00t
(
h00t
)H
R00k
)
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
[
A00k,5
]
tt
tr
(
R00kR
0
0t
)
1
Nt
[
A00k,5
]
kk
(
h00k
)H
h00k
(
h00k
)H
h00k
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
[
A00k,5
]
kk
tr2
(
R00k
)
. (64)
Then, we have
1
Nt
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
A00k,2A
0
0k,1V
0
eqh
0
0k
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
[
A00k,5
]
kk
tr2
(
R00k
)
+
1
Nt
K∑
t=1,t6=k
[
A00k,5
]
tt
tr
(
R00kR
0
0t
)
. (65)
Also, we have
1
Nt
(n˜eq)
H(
V0eq
)H
A00k,2A
0
0k,1V
0
eqh
0
0k
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
×A00k,1A00k,2V0eqn˜eq
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
τN0tr
((
V0eq
)H
A00k,2A
0
0k,1V
0
eqh
0
0k
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
× A00k,1A00k,2V0eq
)
=
1
Nt
τN0
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H(
A00k,1A
0
0k,2
)2
V0eqh
0
0k
=
1
Nt
τN0
(
h00k
)H [
h001, · · ·h00K
] (
A00k,1A
0
0k,2
)2
×R−10
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]H
h00k
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
τN0
([
A00k,4
]
kk
tr2
(
R00k
)
+
K∑
t=1,t6=k
[
A00k,4
]
tt
tr
(
R00kR
0
0t
) .
(66)
Substituting (65) and (66) into (62), we obtain
1
Nt
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
hˆeq,0k
(
hˆeq,0k
)H
V0eqh
0
0k
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
P0
(
P0τ
2
([
A00k,5
]
kk
tr2
(
R00k
)
(67)
+
K∑
t=1,t6=k
[
A00k,5
]
tt
tr
(
R00kR
0
0t
)2
+ 1
Nt
P0N0τ
×
[A00k,4]kktr2 (R00k)+ K∑
t=1,t6=k
[
A00k,4
]
tt
tr
(
R00kR
0
0t
)
= a00k,2. (68)
Substituting (65) and (68) into (61), we obtain
1
Nt
∣∣g00k,k∣∣2 Nt→∞→ PNt a
0
0k,2
a00k,1
. (69)
For
∣∣∣g00t,k∣∣∣2, we obtain∣∣g00t,k∣∣2 = P (h00k)H (V0eq)H hˆeq,0thˆHeq,0t∥∥∥hˆeq,0t∥∥∥2 V0eqh00k. (70)
Following a similar approach as in (52)–(61), the denomi-
nator of (76) is given by
1
Nt
∥∥∥hˆeq,0t∥∥∥2 Nt→∞→
1
Nt
P0
P0τ2
 K∑
p=1,p6=t
[
A00t,4
]
pp
tr
(
R00tR
0
0p
)
+
[
A00t,4
]
tt
tr2
(
R00t
))
+ τN0
K∑
p=1
[
A00t,4
]
pp
tr
(
R00p
)]
= a00t,1.
(71)
For the numerator of (76), we have (72) given at the top of
the next page.
Substituting the expression for V0eq in (49) into (72), we
obtain (73) given at the top of the next page.
By applying [40, Corollary 1] to
(
h00k
)H [
h001, · · ·h00K
]
, we
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1
Nt
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
hˆeq,0k
(
hˆeq,0k
)H
V0eqh
0
0k
=
1
Nt
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H√
P0V
0
eqR
0
0k
(
V0eq
)H(
N0IK + τP0V
0
eqR
0
0k
(
V0eq
)H)−1 (√
P0τV
0
eqh
0
0k +V
0
eqn˜eq
)
×
√
P0
(√
P0τV
0
eqh
0
0k +V
0
eqn˜eq
)H(
N0IK + τP0V
0
eqR
0
0k
(
V0eq
)H)−1
V0eqR
0
0k
(
V0eq
)H
V0eqh
0
0k
=
1
Nt
P0
(√
P0τV
0
eqh
0
0k +V
0
eqn˜eq
)H(
N0IK + τP0V
0
eqR
0
0k
(
V0eq
)H)−1
V0eqR
0
0k
(
V0eq
)H
V0eqh
0
0k
× (h00k)H(V0eq)HV0eqR00k(V0eq)H(N0IK + τP0V0eqR00k(V0eq)H)−1 (√P0τV0eqh00k +V0eqn˜eq)
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
P0
(√
P0τV
0
eqh
0
0k +V
0
eqn˜eq
)H(
N0IK + τP0A
0
0k,1
)−1
A00k,1V
0
eqh
0
0k
× (h00k)H(V0eq)HA00k,1(N0IK + τP0A00k,1)−1 (√P0τV0eqh00k +V0eqn˜eq)
=
1
Nt
P0
(√
P0τ
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
A00k,2A
0
0k,1V
0
eqh
0
0k + (n˜eq)
H(
V0eq
)H
A00k,2A
0
0k,1V
0
eqh
0
0k
)
×
(√
P0τ
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
A00k,1A
0
0k,2V
0
eqh
0
0k+
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
A00k,1A
0
0k,2V
0
eqn˜eq
)
, (62)
1
Nt
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
hˆeq,0thˆ
H
eq,0tV
0
eqh
0
0k
=
1
Nt
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H√
P0V
0
eqR
0
0t
(
V0eq
)H(
N0IK + τP0V
0
eqR
0
0t
(
V0eq
)H)−1
×
(√
P0τV
0
eqh
0
0t +V
0
eqn˜eq
)√
P0
(√
P0τV
0
eqh
0
0t +V
0
eqn˜eq
)H(
N0IK + τP0V
0
eqR
0
0t
(
V0eq
)H)−1
×V0eqR00t
(
V0eq
)H
V0eqh
0
0k
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
P0
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
A00t,1A
0
0t,2
(√
P0τV
0
eqh
0
0t +V
0
eqn˜eq
)
×
(√
P0τV
0
eqh
0
0t +V
0
eqn˜eq
)H
A00t,2A
0
0t,1V
0
eqh
0
0k
=
1
Nt
(P0τ )
2(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
A00t,1A
0
0t,2V
0
eqh
0
0t
(
V0eqh
0
0t
)H
A00t,2A
0
0t,1V
0
eqh
0
0k
+
1
Nt
P0
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
A00t,1A
0
0t,2V
0
eqn˜eq
(
V0eqn˜eq
)H
A00t,2A
0
0t,1V
0
eqh
0
0k. (72)
1
Nt
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
hˆeq,0thˆ
H
eq,0tV
0
eqh
0
0k
=
1
Nt
(P0τ)
2(
h00k
)H [
h001, · · ·h00K
]
R
−1/2
0 A
0
0t,1A
0
0t,2R
−1/2
0
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]H
h00t
× (h00t)H[h001, · · ·h00K]HR−1/20 A00t,2A00t,1R−1/20 [h001, · · ·h00K]Hh00k
+
1
Nt
P0
(
h00k
)H [
h001, · · ·h00K
]
R
−1/2
0 A
0
0t,1A
0
0t,2R
−1/2
0
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]H
n˜eq
× (n˜eq)H
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]
R
−1/2
0 A
0
0t,2A
0
0t,1R
−1/2
0
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]
h00k
=
1
Nt
(P0τ)
2(
h00k
)H [
h001, · · ·h00K
]
A00t,5
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]H
h00t
× (h00t)H[h001, · · ·h00K]HA00t,5[h001, · · ·h00K]Hh00k
+
1
Nt
P0
(
h00k
)H [
h001, · · ·h00K
]
A00t,5
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]H
n˜eq
× (n˜eq)H
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]
A00t,5
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]
h00k. (73)
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have
1
Nt
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
hˆeq,0thˆ
H
eq,0tV
0
eqh
0
0k
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
(P0τ )
2
tr
(
R00k
) [
A00t,5
]
kk
eHk
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]H
h00t
× (h00t)H [h001, · · ·h00K] ektr (R00k) [A00t,5]kk
+
1
Nt
P0tr
(
R00k
) [
A00t,5
]
kk
eHk
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]H
n˜eq
× (n˜eq)H
[
h001, · · ·h00K
]−1/2
0
ektr
(
R00k
) [
A00t,5
]
kk
, (74)
which can be simplified further as
1
Nt
(
h00k
)H(
V0eq
)H
hˆeq,0thˆ
H
eq,0tV
0
eqh
0
0k
=
1
Nt
(
P0τtr
(
R00k
) [
A00t,5
]
kk
)2(
h00k
)H
h00t
(
h00t
)H
h00k
+
1
Nt
P0
(
tr
(
R00k
) [
A00t,5
]
kk
)2(
h00k
)H
n˜eq(n˜eq)
H
h00k
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
(
P0τtr
(
R00k
) [
A00t,5
]
kk
)2
tr
(
R00kR
0
0t
)
+
1
Nt
P0τN0tr
3
(
R00k
)([
A00t,5
]
kk
)2
=b00t,k. (75)
By combining (69), (71), and (75), we obtain
1
Nt
∣∣g00t,k∣∣2 Nt→∞→ PNt b
0
0t,k
a00t,1
. (76)
Then, we consider
∣∣∣g0lt,k∣∣∣2, which leads to
P
Nt
∣∣g0lt,k∣∣2= PNt (h0lk)H (Vleq)H
hˆeq,lt
(
hˆeq,lt
)H
∥∥∥hˆeq,lt∥∥∥2 Vleqh0lk.
(77)
Following a similar approach as in (52)–(61), the denomi-
nator of (77) is obtained as
1
Nt
∥∥∥hˆeq,lt∥∥∥2 Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
PI×PIτ2
 K∑
p=1,p6=t
[
Allt,4
]
pp
tr
(
RlltR
l
lp
)
+
[
Allt,4
]
tt
tr2
(
Rllt
)
+τN0
K∑
p=1
[
Allt,4
]
pp
tr
(
Rllp
)]
=allt,1. (78)
For the numerator of (77), we have (79) given at the top of
the next page.
Based on (50), we can re-express (79) as (80) given at the
top of the next page.
For the first term on the right hand side of (80), we have
(81) given at the top of the next page.
For the second term on the right hand side of (80), we have
(82) given at the top of the next page.
Substituting (81) and (82) into (80), we obtain
1
Nt
(
h0lk
)H(
Vleq
)H
hˆeq,lthˆ
H
eq,ltV
l
eqh
0
lk
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
P 2I τ
2tr2
(
Rllt
) [
Allt,5
]2
tt
tr
(
RlltR
0
lk
)
+
1
Nt
PIτN0
(
K∑
p=1
[
Allt 5
]2
pp
tr
(
R0lkR
l
lp
)
tr
(
Rllp
)
+
K∑
p=1
K∑
m=1,m 6=p
[
Allt,5
]
pp
[
Allt,5
]
mm
tr
(
RllpR
0
lkR
l
lm
)
= cllt,1. (83)
By combining (77), (78), and (83), we obtain
P
Nt
∣∣g0lt,k∣∣2 Nt→∞→ PNt c
l
lt,1
allt,1
. (84)
For Cevek in (11), we know from (43) that when Nt →∞,
V0eqH
0
e → 0. Therefore, we have
Cevek
Nt→∞→ 0. (85)
Substituting (69), (76), (77), and (85) into (7) completes the
proof.
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1
Nt
(
h0lk
)H(
Vleq
)H
hˆeq,lthˆ
H
eq,ltV
l
eqh
0
lk
=
1
Nt
(
h0lk
)H(
Vleq
)H√
PIV
l
eqR
l
lt
(
Vleq
)H(
N0IK + τPIV
l
eqR
l
lt
(
Vleq
)H)−1 (√
PIτV
l
eqh
l
lt +V
l
eqn˜eq
)
×
√
PI
(√
PIτV
l
eqh
l
lt +V
l
eqn˜eq
)H(
N0IK + τPIV
l
eqR
l
lt
(
Vleq
)H)−1
VleqR
l
lt
(
Vleq
)H
Vleqh
0
lk
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
PI
(
h0lk
)H(
Vleq
)H
Allt,1A
l
lt,2
(√
PIτV
l
eqh
l
lt +V
l
eqn˜eq
)(√
PIτV
l
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